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An Appraisal Of The Leap Of Faith
Gary R. Habermas
Where has the leap of faith concept come from? What has it fostered? Does it provide an
adequate foundation for the Christian faith? This article will critique the development of the
leap of faith through Lessing, Kant and Kierkegaard. It will then evaluate the theological and
philosophical positions that have grown from it and its present status in light of the Scriptures.
In contemporary theological thought, few concepts have had more influence than that of the leap of faith.1
As formulated by philosophers like Gotthold Lessing, Immanuel Kant and Soren Kierkegaard,2 such
approaches have contributed to a fideistic foundation which has served at least as a partial epistemological
basis for the theological systems of Karl Barth and others in the twentieth century theological spectrum.
We will first analyze the leap of faith as presented by these three thinkers. Then we will briefly address some
of the influences that these teachings have had, followed by a general critique of this concept.

Analysis
Gotthold Lessing (1729-1781)
While working as a librarian at Wolfenbuttel, Lessing acquired a 4,000 page manuscript entitled An Apology
for the Rational Worshippers of God, written by German rationalist Hermann Reimarus. Lessing
anonymously published seven fragments from this work between 1774 and 1778. In his manuscript,
Reimarus had depicted Jesus not as the miracle per—
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forming Son of God, but as a basically disillusioned apocalyptic preacher. Thus, Reimarus denied the
supernatural aspects of the life of Jesus as they are depicted in the New Testament.3 In answer to
Reimarus’ denials, Lessing countered in a seeming halfhearted manner by saying that many replies could
be given. But Lessing thought that it was not crucial that Reimarus’ challenges be refuted because the truth
of Christianity did not depend upon objective defenses of the faith, but on the value of Jesus’ teachings. In
other words, Lessing judged that Reimarus therefore provided no threat to Christianity because faith is not
based upon history, and on whether certain events really occurred, but on the truthfulness of the teachings
presented by Jesus.4
Lessing explained further that if he had lived during Christ’s time and had witnessed His miracles and
fulfilled prophecy firsthand, then he could accept these as proofs since he would have been an eyewitness
to these evidences. Lessing’s problem, however, was that he lived in the eighteenth century and believed
that miracles were no longer observable, therefore meaning that the proof of eyewitnesses had now
passed.5
Since the day of direct testimony was gone, modem man was left with only the records of these events.
Lessing noted that he did not deny the biblical reports that Jesus both performed miracles and fulfilled
prophecy. In fact, he asserted that the reports of these supernatural incidents were as trustworthy as any
other historical truths. He even stated that the resurrection of Jesus was historically certain and that he had
no historical grounds on which to doubt it.6 However, if all we have is the records of these events, Lessing
was forced to decide whether such historical certainty provided any assurance on which to rest the

truthfulness of theology. He posed the question of whether history was a sufficient basis for matters of faith.
Lessing’s answer was that even historical certainty was not the same as the proof which was supplied to
those who were
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actually eyewitnesses of these facts. Briefly, history is not an adequate replacement for the missing proof
which is forever lost when it is no longer possible to be personal eyewitnesses to these events.
The basic problem behind this conclusion, as far as Lessing was concerned, was that history could only be
known according to certain levels of probability. It is true that historical methodology could reveal knowledge
concerning events which occurred in the past and thereby provide adequate grounds for accepting these
events as fact. However, it is always possible that the data concerning a particular event were somehow in
error. Accordingly, Lessing concluded that nothing could be proven, based on history, simply because
historiography was not one hundred per cent accurate. This is especially the case when one endeavors to
base theological truths upon history. Lessing complained that such would be to risk our most treasured
beliefs on events which were known only according to the canons of probability. Therefore, one should not
conclude that theological beliefs are true because of any historical basis which bears out this claim. To
succinctly sum up Lessing’s point in his own words, “accidental truths of history can never become the proof
of necessary truths of reason.”7
Therefore, Lessing thought that history could not support faith at all. In his own, now-celebrated, words:
That, then, is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, how ever often and however
earnestly I have tried to make the leap. If anyone can help me over it, let him do it, I beg him, I
adjure him. He will deserve a divine reward from me.8
Regardless of the inability of history to provide a basis for faith, Lessing declared that he was still not
deterred in believing the theological truths of Christianity. He declared his acceptance of Jesus’ teachings on
non-evidential grounds.9 As we will observe, Lessing provided an impetus for others who also desired to
divorce history from faith. History was only capable of establishing events according to probability, while faith
demanded a more solid foundation.
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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
Although somewhat differently, Kant also separated empirical knowledge from religious truth. However, such
a study involves the broader topic of Kant’s epistemology, which is far beyond the scope and intent of this
essay. Therefore, it should be noted that we will speci f ically address Kant’s contribution to the subject of
the leap of faith as shown by his separation of history and faith.
For Kant, miracles in the life of Jesus, such as the virgin birth, do not provide practical benefit regarding the
acceptance of Christianity. In fact, miracles are actually a hindrance in that they elevate Jesus so that he
can no longer serve as a human example for us. If our doctrine depended on such historical events, that
would be a different matter. But our beliefs do not rely on such historical confirmation, but upon the moral
commands engraved on the heart and known by practical reason.
Therefore, miracles are superfluous; morality does not need historical vindication. Rather, morality is selfauthenticating, derived by the pure faith of practical reason.10 The result is a distinct separation between
historical events and moral commitment. A test case is Jesus’ resurrection. Kant holds that this occurrence
cannot be employed in the interest of a religion based on practical reason. This event is even burdensome
to true faith, which requires no miraculous evidence.11
Yet, it still does not follow that the facticity of miracles ought to be questioned. For Kant, sensible persons
will recognize that miracles may occur; we need not dispense with them, especially in the life of Christ. But

we should also avoid basing our belief on their occurrence. Again, practical reason provides its own
truthfulness and does not need objective evidences.12 And like Lessing, Kant declares that historiography
could always involve some effors.13
So Kant regarded the empirical data of history as insufficient to communicate the reality of transcendent
truths.
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Seemingly utilizing Lessing’s analogy, Kant concluded that between these two categories exists “a mighty
chasm, the overleaping of which leads at once to anthropomorphism.”14 We note that Lessing’s ugly ditch
had become, for Kant, a “mighty chasm.”
To conclude this brief section, Immanuel Kant agreed with Lessing that history provided no basis for faith.
Miracles may actually have occurred, yet religious belief does not depend or build on them. The moral
commands written on man’s heart, revealed by practical reason, are all that is needed.

Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855)
The writings of Kierkegaard contain one of the most indepth treatments of the concept of the leap of faith,
even though the nature of this philosopher’s own view on the subject is hotly disputed. Regardless, the view
taken in this essay is that Kierkegaard was a major influence on the separation of history and faith, even if
he did not mean to be so.15
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In spite of the fact that many philosophers had championed the cause of reason as the chief criteria for
judging truthclaims, Kierkegaard’s works argued that such approaches were invalid. He defended the dictum
that “Truth is Subjectivity.” This was especially true of eternal truth and values.16
Kierkegaard declared that disciplines such as mathematics or history could yield true, objective facts, but
they cannot lead one to eternal truth. In this last sense, at least, objectivity fails, because, once again, “Truth
is Subjectivity.”
Subjectivity culminated in “passion,” which is its highest expression. Faith, in turn, is said to be the ultimate
passion.17 Therefore, faith is the apex of religious knowledge. In sum, since subjectivity is the way to Truth
and faith is the ultimate expression of subjectivity, it follows that we can only learn truth about God by an
inner process, by faith in Him.
Thus it is impossible to find God by any objective means; He is inaccessible by such approaches. God is
Subject and can only be known subjectively. Emphasizing his point, Kierkegaard even argued that an
objective faith is paganistic.18
So when reason attempts to prove God’s existence, it reaches a dead end. Reason can be taken as far as
possible, only to find that it cannot reveal God. In fact, after all attempts to make God known by such proofs,
it is found that He is no closer than before. In short, reason does not reach God at all.19
But beyond philosophical arguments, Kierkegaard followed Lessing in stating that historical evidences also
provide no support for believing religious truths. To state the position succinctly, “there can in all eternity be
no direct transition from the historical to the eternal, whether the historical is contemporary or not.”20 So
whether an individual was contemporary with the historical facts or whether he was removed by
generations, it
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made no ultimate difference. Here Kierkegaard seemed to go even further than Lessing, who at least stated
that being contemporary with Jesus’ miracles and the fulfillment of prophecy would have provided a proof.
For Kierkegaard, however, contemporaneity provided no advantage. Therefore, both proofs for God’s

existence and historical evidences are disavowed as means by which to reach God. Since eternal truth is
achieved by a subjective expression of faith, objective approaches such as these cannot yield either a true
faith or eternal happiness.21
Kierkegaard was still clear in his belief that Jesus was an historical Person, having entered time as a man.
Jesus was born, lived, died and rose again in history.22
Even though these events are truly historical, however, they comprise the supreme Christian paradox
because the incarnation is rationally inexplicable. Such occurrences may even be termed contradictory
because human reason dictates that they are impossible. So even though the incarnation actually took
place, miracles such as Jesus’ resurrection cannot be established historically (or by other means). It is
impossible to demonstrate a contradiction, even though it actually occurred! Neither can evidences make
such paradoxes any less absurd or contradictory.23
Kierkegaard did think that historical probabilities may be obtained in favor of events in Jesus’ life. However,
such really only complicate the issue because that which is known to be true according to probability cannot
be believed. To the contrary, Christian truth demands faith, which is the only way to jump the probability gap
and provide one with certainty. Only by faith in this ultimate paradox can a person find eternal happiness.24
Kierkegaard’s stress on the leap of faith came from this emphasis upon subjectivity. God cannot be reached
by theistic proofs, historical evidences or any other objective means. As long as one insists on holding to
such modes of verification, God’s existence will never be accurately understood. Only when these
demonstrations are forsaken and God is trusted by faith may one be assured that God does exist. For
Kierkegaard,
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the leap of faith occurs in that moment when the individual renounces of his rational endeavors to reach
God and embraces Him by faith alone. In this sense, Lessing’s ugly ditch is bridged by faith, as one leaps to
God without any verification.25
So Kierkegaard emphasized the need for faith in God; all objective approaches fail to approach Him. One
finds the way to eternal happiness at that moment at which he relinquishes these evidences and leaps to
God by faith. For Kierkegaard, truth was subjectivity.

A Comparison of Viewpoints
In analyzing the viewpoints of Lessing, Kant and Kierkegaard on the subject of the leap of faith, there are at
least three closely-related areas of agreement between these philosophers. First, the truthfulness of
Christianity cannot be established by philosophical, historical or other objective approaches. So while history
can establish events, it cannot convey eternal truth.
Second, the issue is further complicated in that historical facts can only be recognized as true according to
the canons of probability; there may always be errors in historical reports. Further, Kierkegaard insists that if
it can be ascertained that a given event such as a miracle actually occurred, it can no longer be trusted by
faith alone.
Third, the essence of Christianity resides in a more subjective mode. For Lessing, the stress is on the
truthfulness of Jesus’ message apart from history. For Kant, the key is the moral standard written on one’s
heart. For Kierkegaard, the answer is found in a radical faith in God completely independent of any objective
evidences.
This is not to minimize the differing systems of these three philosophers, but they agree that religious truth
is not based on any objective, evidential approaches to God. But beyond the issue of evidences and faith, at
least Kant seems to think that a factual basis is not even crucial. Specifically on their views concerning the
leap of faith, there are some close similarities.
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Influences
We have noted that the concept of the leap of faith, as formulated by Lessing, Kant and Kierkegaard, has
had an immense influence on contemporary theology. Utilizing similar methodologies, many modem critical
scholars have also assumed or asserted that one cannot require historical or other evidential reasoning on
behalf of Christianity. One can only affirm the Christian faith independent of such demonstrations. Perhaps
even a brief survey of a major strain in contemporary thought will reveal this thesis.
This influence can be seen very plainly in the twentieth century in the early writings of Karl Barth. For
instance, in his epoch-making work The Epistle to the Romans, Barth addressed the need to exercise faith
in Christ and His resurrection, asserting that this encounter is “the impossible possibility of all possibilities, as
the abyss into which no man can leap and yet into which we do all leap.”26 Lessing’s “ugly ditch” and Kant’s
“mighty chasm,” which we do not jump, have become an “abyss” into which we take a leap by exercising
faith in Christ.27
In an early lecture delivered in 1920, Barth stated that the Easter message is the theme of Scripture. He
explained that the resurrection actually happened, but not as normal history. For one thing, it ought to be
believed, but is totally beyond proof. This distinction between the resurrection both being and not being
history at the same time is also clearly present in The Epistle to the Romans28 Then be declared:
But let us not for moment conceal from ourselves the fact that obedience to this vision — our
actual acceptance of what the Bible proposes — is a step into space, an undertaking of
unknown conse quences, a venture into eternity. Better first to stop and count the cost, than to
leap too short.29
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These are not the only examples of Barth’s “leap language.” In a 1922 discourse, he made a theological
reference to the “unbridgeable chasm,”30 a phrase very much reminiscent of Kant’s. Significantly, Barth
claimed that his inspiration for some of these ideas came from Kierkegaard.31
So Barth believed that Christians made a leap of faith when believing God’s message and that such was
apart from any historical or other evidences. He pointed out often that events such as Jesus’ resurrection
are “beyond proof”32 and are thus not open to historical investigation, but are to be grasped by faith alone.33
Such a position is not only a feature of the early Barth. In this theologian’s later stages he did not alter his
fundamental position. For example, he thought that Jesus’ resurrection should not be proven, because the
gospel message is based on faith, not on historical verification.34 But to be clear (and similar to
Kierkegaard), Barth still believed that Jesus literally rose from the dead. In fact, he appears to be more clear
about this is his later writings.35
Whether speaking of the early or the later Barth, then, the truth of Christianity is to be accepted by faith and
not by any type of historical or other verification. In this conclusion Barth especially follows the teachings of
Kierkegaard. Further, both conceive of miracles such as the resurrection as actually occurring but in a
somewhat different order of history than that of normal events.36
Many neo-orthodox theologians also agreed with Barth’s
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position concerning the lack of any need for verification of the gospel, thereby keeping faith separate from
evidences. For instance, Emil Brunner appears to struggle in his answer to the question of whether and in
what sense it might be said that Jesus really did rise from the dead. It is quite plain, however, that he
believed that faith cannot be based on any type of historical investigation at all. Much like Lessing and
Kierkegaard, Brunner thought that the uncertainty of history made it a precarious basis for faith.37

Similarly, Dietrich Bonhoeffer held that knowledge concerning Jesus Christ cannot be grounded in historical
inquiry. Such objective confirmation is irrelevant to the Christian faith, which needs no such verification.
Accordingly, Jesus Christ remains a paradox to human reason.38
Reinhold Niebuhr held a similar view. Efforts to bolster the Christian faith by historical investigation were
actually expressions of skepticism. Such a practice was in opposition to true faith because Jesus Christ
cannot be known by history, but only by the exercise of faith.39
Even this brief survey provides an example of how certain neo-orthodox theologians followed Barth on the
separation of faith and historical investigation. Barth, in turn, had been strongly influenced by the position of
earlier scholars such as Kierkegaard. Others in the twentieth century were likewise convinced of the validity
of these views.40
The separation of faith from historical evidences, if not from the actual facts themselves,41 has perhaps
been the prevail—
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ing attitude on this subject through a large portion of the twentieth century. But there are a number of signs
that what had perhaps been the most influential attitude for so much of this century is much less popular
today. This is partially because the contemporary theological fragmentation has manifested varying
amounts of dissatisfaction with the formerly predominant existential tendencies in critical theology earlier this
century.
However, even our brief survey has argued that the theses of Lessing, Kant and Kierkegaard concerning
the inability of historical verification to bolster faith have exercised tremendous influence on twentieth
century theological thought and still continue to do so. A critique of this general viewpoint will serve as a
conclusion for this study.

Critique
Initially, it must be admitted that certain fideistic approaches to Christian truth have contributed some
positive emphases to theology. For example, these scholars are certainly correct in insisting that objective
investigations are not substitutes for faith in God. Also, the emphasis on a believer’s radical commitment to
God is quite a welcome facet of such systems. Additionally, many fideistic believers do accept the God of
the Scriptures and His Self-revelation to man.
Yet, in spite of these positive emphases, there are several major criticisms which plague the general attitude
outlined in this essay. Three such problems will be outlined here.
First, apart from some sort of basis for belief, how can it be known if a faith system is legitimate or not?
Granted, scholars such as Lessing and Kierkegaard reject the need for such validation. However, apart from
such objective data, how can their claims even be judged?
For example, how can it be known that Christianity is the only true religion? Faith in another system could as
easily be urged by these fideistic means. Or how do we choose between competing options? Should we
urge others to “simply believe?” And are Muslims free to believe in their own revelation?42
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So it ought to be plain that such methodologies never allow us to be sure if our faith is spurious or not.
Perhaps faith was not exercised in the correct way. What if the object of ones faith was ultimately incapable
of sustaining that belief, such as would be the case if another religion was chosen?
Another problem is that such faith cannot even be distinguished from human emotions. In brief, “I feel” could
easily be substituted for “I know,” apart from any testable criteria.
Kierkegaard was fond of encouraging others to accept the truth of Christianity by faith, thereby achieving
“eternal happiness.” But again, if he objected to demonstration, how can belief be enjoined upon others? As

summarized elsewhere:
to abandon a rational basis for faith can lead to eternal happiness only if one simply ignores
any faith-related questions that might arise, such as these which have been raised here. One
would have to wear earmuffs and blinders of irrationality in order to forsake all needs and
desires to rationalize just so that one might achieve a temporary and fleeting “eternal
happiness” which lasts only until the next doubt arises. And the questions raised here would still
remain unanswered — one would never know if one’s faith-commitment was valid or even if it
was warranted in the first place.43
This first criticism may be summarized:
faith is not simply a cerebral exercise devoid of consequences if it just happened to be false.
Much is at risk for those who place high value (indeed, eternal value) in their faith if it is found
to be illegitimate.44
A second major criticism of systems which espouse the leap of faith concerns the rejection of history as a
legitimate basis for faith. In opposition to this thesis, history is a valid foundation for faith for several reasons.
Initially, just because historical research may be in error does not mean that it must be so; it could also be
accurate. So it would be incumbent upon the critic to show where the error is located.
Also, to describe history in terms of probability language
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is misleading. As Lessing and Kierkegaard acknowledge, history can basically be known like other objective
disciplines. But to opt for “faith language” in light of the very nonrmal and answerable problems in
historiography does not somehow magically transport us above the vagaries of history. In other words, to
flee to the realm of some sort of self-authenticating faith does not solve the pithy problems raised above.
But history does constitute a valid process of inquiry.45 Subsequently, while Lessing is correct that historical
records are not the same as personally being an eyewitness, it does not follow that history is somehow
incompetent to discover data of the past. As we have said, even Lessing thought that such historical data
was discoverable. So the issue of eyewitness observance versus history is a smoke screen. Indeed,
historiography largely attempts to investigate eyewitness records.
Further, to reject history would be to reject inductive principles similar to those which we accept in everyday
life. Actually, inductive grounds are used daily in regards to decision-making, our health, choosing food to
eat, or which job to accept.
Additionally, historical principles such as eyewitness testimony are employed in Scripture Itself. How do we
even preach the gospel data of the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus Christ without using some of the
same standards?
Continuing, the New Testament cites the historical evidence for the gospel on many occasions, specifically
encouraging belief in this data.46 Why should Christians have problems with such an historical basis when
Scripture encourages it? These last two points alone should be sufficient for believers to note significant
problems with this entire methodology.
Earlier we differentiated between fideistic approaches which deny evidences and those which denounce
both facts and evidences. The third major critique especially concerns the latter group, but sometimes
applies to the former, as well. To question or disallow the facts is ultimately to question the gospel data
itself.
In other words, when one attempts too strenuously to
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separate facts from faith, the New Testament teaching that salvation depends on both the gospel facts and

faith is in jeopardy. Although faith is undeniably an indispensable part of the salvation message (Heb. 11:6),
so is the factual content also necessary. Without the latter, there is also no biblical salvation; faith, without a
basis, is vain and cannot stand alone (1 Cor. 15:14, 17).
The lesson of history is that even to begin to play down either one side of salvation or the other (gospel
facts + faith=salvation47 ) is to tip the scales precariously out of balance. But neither side of the “equation”
should be elevated above the other. Yet, while some “leapers” still affirmed the historicity of the gospel facts
(Kierkegaard, Barth), others concluded that these data were either not true or were at least superfluous
(Kant, R. Niebuhr, Bultmann).
One side-lesson here is that some confuse evidences with the facts themselves. While one can certainly
deny the pursuit of evidence and be a believer, denying the gospel facts would rule out that possibility (1
Cor. 15:1–5). But fideism denies at least the first, and sometimes the second, as well. To trifle with the
factual basis of the gospel is indeed a risky undertaking, even in terms of eternity!
This critique may be summarized briefly. First, in terms of legitimation, the Christian faith needs an objective
foundation, even in order to enjoin it upon others. Second, history provides an adequate basis, especially
when we find it utilized repeatedly in Scripture. Third, fideism comes precariously close to denying the
gospel facts themselves, and even does so in a number of scholars.
In short, fideistic approaches have been very popular and have had an immense influence. However, to
assert that such views are extremely dangerous is not just to make a theoretical critique; the problem strikes
at the very heart of the central Christian message of the gospel. Such leap of faith positions fail to provide
the Christian faith with an adequate biblical, theological, philosophical or apologetic foundation.
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